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Logic and Music in Plato’s Phaedo
D. T. J. BAILEY
ABSTRACT
This paper aims to achieve a better understanding of what Socrates means by
“sumfvne›n” in the sections of the Phaedo in which he uses the word, and how
its use contributes both to the articulation of the hypothetical method and the
proof of the soul’s immortality. Section I sets out the well-known problems for
the most obvious readings of the relation, while Sections II and III argue against
two remedies for these problems, the first an interpretation of what the sum-
fvne›n relation consists in, the second an interpretation of what sorts of thing
the relation is meant to relate. My positive account in Section IV argues that we
should take the musical connotations of the term seriously, and that Plato was
thinking of a robust analogy between the way pitches form unities when related
by certain intervals, and the way theoretical claims form unities when related by
explanatory co-dependence. Section V surveys the work of IV from the point of
view of the initial difficulties and suggests further consequences for the hypo-
thetical method, including the logical relation between the sumfvne›n and
diafvne›n relations, and the need for care in ordering the results of a hypothesis.
“But anyhow I proceeded in this way: on each occasion hypothesising the lÒgow
which I judged to be strongest, I put down as true the things that seem to me to
sumfvne›n with it – both about a causal account and any of the other things that
are – but those things that did not I put down as false.” (Phaedo 100a3-7).
“But if someone clung to the hypothesis itself, you would bid him goodbye and
wouldn’t answer him until you had examined its results, whether according to
you they sumfvne› or diafvne› with one another.” (Phaedo 101d3-5).
I. The Difficulty
These two passages from Socrates’ Second Voyage in the Phaedo create
a famous problem about how to understand what Socrates means by the
verb sumfvne›n. One would expect the word to be univocal across its
instances in the passages, partly because they appear so close together (an
abrupt change in the use of the same word in such a short space of time
seems unlikely), and partly because Socrates is here attempting to give a
sense to what looks like the technical vocabulary of his new method. It
is in giving a sense to technical vocabulary that one should be as self-
conscious as possible about one’s language: it would therefore be most
unfortunate if we had to attribute ambiguous use to Socrates when he is
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1 I translate lÒgow as “justification” advisedly, but not without unease. Translating
it as “proposition” here would surely be too weak: it cannot mean just any proposi-
tion, but a special kind of proposition, a justificatory one. But previously, in the famous
“looking in lÒgoi” passage at 99d3-e6, it ought not to have meant “justification”, since
it is hardly illuminating to be told to look in justifications when one is searching for
the truth about things.
doing just that. But, on the face of it, it seems that we must either impute
an ambiguity to his use of sumfvne›n, or give him a lunatic methodology
that no one could possibly follow.
Let me start with the second passage. Socrates seems to be telling us
not to go about giving a justification (lÒgow)1 for a hypothesis until we
have examined its results (ırmhy°nta) and seen that they are consistent
with one another (éllÆloiw sumfvne›). Then and only then should we try
to give an explanation of the hypothesis from which we got those results.
That piece of advice makes good methodological sense, for the following
reason. If you can show that inconsistent propositions follow from a
hypothesis, that’s enough for you to know straight away that the hypoth-
esis is false – in fact self-contradictory – even though establishing that no
inconsistency results is not sufficient to establish that the hypothesis is
true. In other words, checking the results of your hypothesis for consis-
tency is the best way to respond to the impatient interlocutor who wants
a justification for the hypothesis as soon as you have made it. For the
need to defend the hypothesis with a lÒgow is surely abnegated if you find
out that it is self-contradictory, which it will be if it yields inconsistent
results. So checking your ırmhy°nta for consistency offers the prospect of
finding, as soon as possible, something sufficient for a final decision on
the truth-value of your hypothesis: why cast about for a justification for
a claim before you have satisfied yourself that the claim is not necessar-
ily false?
But there are two problems with understanding sumfvne›n as “to be
consistent with”. Firstly, that is plainly not how Plato uses the word in
other contexts, particularly Cratylus 436d1ff. Here Socrates and Cratylus
agree that the etymologies discussed in the dialogue thus far indicate that
names generally sumfvne› one another by virtue of their all saying that
their referents are in flux. Socrates goes on to argue that this kind of con-
sistency is no guarantee of truth: for all the agreement among names dis-
covered so far, the name giver might have been wrong from the start in
supposing that the world is as Heraclitus said it is. But this relation among
names, even though it cannot guarantee the correctness of any one of
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2 I need to write “accept” rather than “assert” here. After all, the billion-fold nega-
tion of “It’s teatime” follows from “It’s teatime”. But just because I assert that it’s
teatime, I have no reason to assert its billion-fold negation, although I better had
accept the latter as true whenever I do assert that it is teatime.
them, is surely stronger than the logical relation of consistency. A set of
propositions is consistent if and only if there is no disagreement among
its members: propositions having nothing to do with one another are con-
sistent provided they could be true together. But when Socrates and
Cratylus agree that all the names they have discussed so far sumfvne› one
another, there is more to be said for them than that they lack disagree-
ment. They have more in common than that by virtue of all telling the
same story about the world.
But that the word crops up in other contexts meaning a relation stronger
than mere consistency is a trifling difficulty compared with the second.
The consequences are much graver if we suppose that Socrates means “to
be consistent with” by his use of sumfvne›n in the first passage above.
There Socrates tells us that he puts down as true whatever bears this rela-
tion to the hypothesis. But for any hypothesis, there will be an infinite
number of propositions which are consistent with it, but which we have
no independent reason to assert. Surely we are not to set these down as
true simply because they bear a relation as weak as consistency to the
hypothesis. It sounds ludicrous – and of course it results in disaster. For
among this infinite number of propositions there will be pairs of propo-
sitions inconsistent with one another. So if Socrates means nothing 
more than “to be consistent with” by sumfvne›n, then he is effectively
telling us in the first passage to assert contradictions, and his method is
utterly crazy.
These two problems urge the thought that the sumfvne›n relation must
be stronger than that of consistency. So perhaps it is as strong as entail-
ment. Socrates would then be telling us in the first passage to put down
as true all and only those propositions that are entailed by the original
hypothesis. In that case he would not be inviting us to assert propositions
we have no reason to hold true: for indeed you do have good reason to
accept2 a proposition if it follows from a proposition you have already
asserted. Nor will he be inviting us to assert contradictions in the first pas-
sage – or at least, if we are invited to assert a contradiction on the basis
that one followed from the hypothesis, that would be sufficient for us to
know that the hypothesis is necessarily false.
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3 It cannot be, of course, provided that we accept the Law of Excluded Middle, a
more controversial principle than the Law of Non-Contradiction. But even so, sup-
posing that Socrates might not subscribe to the Law of Excluded Middle is obviously
much too high a price to pay in order to save the entailment reading, and would not
But sadly this interpretation will not do either. For it fails to make sense
of sumfvne›n in the second passage. There, it seems likely that Socrates
is talking of a relationship such that, if it holds between the results of a
hypothesis, then that is reason to continue supposing the hypothesis true,
but if it fails to hold, that is reason to suppose the hypothesis false.
Whatever this relation is, it better had not be entailment, for it need not
be the case that the results of true hypotheses entail one another. It is true
that water is H2O; from this, it follows that water is a compound; and it
also follows that water contains oxygen. But neither of these results entails
the other. A stuff need not contain oxygen in order to be a compound,
while there is at least one stuff which contains oxygen without being a
compound, namely oxygen itself, or at any rate a pure sample of it. If
Socrates means “entail one another” by éllÆloiw sumfvne›, then the
results of the hypothesis that water is H2O do not éllÆloiw sumfvne›.
But that is no reason to deem false the hypothesis that water is H2O.
And of course there is a more serious reason for rejecting the entail-
ment reading, for it makes out that the first passage this time advocates
the same outrageous promiscuity we found on the “consistency” interpre-
tation. It was ludicrous to put down as true all the propositions consistent
with the hypothesis because this involved us in, among other things,
asserting contradictions. But it is also ludicrous to put down as false all
the propositions which are not entailed by the hypothesis. For once again
there will be an infinite number of them, including propositions we have
independent reason to suppose true, and also contradictory pairs of propo-
sitions. Of course there is nothing wrong with putting down as false a
conjunction of contradictory pairs: that is precisely what one ought to do.
But it follows from what Socrates says in the first passage, on the entail-
ment reading, that we will have to put down as false each member of a
contradictory pair if neither is entailed by the hypothesis, and that is
indeed disastrous. From the hypothesis that water is H2O it does not fol-
low that I am in my office; nor does it follow, from the same hypothesis,
that I am outside my office. But we had better not put down as false both
these non-entailed propositions, for it cannot be that I am neither in my
office nor outside it.3 So once again we have an interpretation that gives
Socrates an unusable method.
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by itself be sufficient to save that reading anyhow, for Socrates would still be telling
us to deny many things we have no reason to deny.
4 J. Gentzler, “sumfvne›n in Plato’s Phaedo” in Phronesis 1991 pp. 265-276. This
paper owes a good deal to Gentzler’s presentation of the issues.
II. The Current View
The best current solution to this problem is due to Jyl Gentzler.4 Reflecting
on these problems for both the “consistency” and “entailment” interpretations
of the sumfvne›n relation, she argues that Socrates must be talking about
an interim relation, stronger than consistency but weaker than entailment:
that is, a relation for which consistency is necessary but not sufficient, and
for which entailment is sufficient but not necessary. A proposition q must
be consistent with p in order to sumfvne› p, but that by itself is not enough
for q to sumfvne› p; if q is entailed by p, then it will sumfvne› p, although
it need not do the former in order to do the latter.
In what follows I shall be arguing that Gentzler is basically right in
thinking that the relation lies somewhere between consistency and entail-
ment, but the devil is in the details that need spelling out in showing what
that involves, and in relating those details to the hypothetical method in
general and the argumentative context in particular. Gentzler’s details, sadly,
do not add up to a genuine relation: for some propositions can perfectly
well entail others with which they are inconsistent, namely their own
negations. In fact Gentzler’s relation will both hold and not hold between
a contradiction and its negation, as I shall show. To put the point in con-
text, if Socrates means Gentzler’s relation when he uses the word sum-
fvne›n, then it follows that he will be unable to use that peculiarly helpful
style of reasoning, so beloved of Greek mathematicians, known as argu-
ing by reductio ad absurdum, which exploits the properties of such propo-
sitions. When we argue by reductio ad absurdum, we give grounds for
supposing a proposition false because it entails a contradiction, in which
case it is self-contradictory. Now Gentzler’s relation is such that q has to
be consistent with p if p entails it, given that entailment is sufficient but
consistency necessary for p to sumfvne› with q. But what about the situ-
ation in which q is none other than ¬p? If Gentzler’s Socrates were to find
out that his hypothesis entailed its own negation – that is, if he were to
refute it by reductio ad absurdum – then far from doing the sensible thing
and rejecting his hypothesis as false because self-contradictory, he would
have to conclude that he had made an invalid inference somewhere along
the way. For the fact that p and ¬p are inconsistent with one another would
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5 In correspondence, Andrew Barker has suggested a riposte to this argument: Socrates
might still work with a relation such as Gentzler’s because in calling his hypothesis
“the strongest” in the first place, presumably he indicates that he is confident that it
is not self-contradictory. I reply simply that such confidence would of course be no
guarantee that in fact his hypothesis is not self-contradictory, any more than Frege’s
confidence that Axiom V was “purely logical” (Preface to Grungesetze der Arithmetik
Vol. 1 (1893)) was enough to save it from Russell’s paradox. The comparison with
Frege aside, Barker’s defence of Gentzler seems to be prima facie implausible on the
following grounds: the whole point of calling something a hypothesis in the first place
is to indicate its provisionality, the fact that it is not yet known for all that it is sup-
posed, and is to that extent revisable. But if a proposition is treated as revisable in
principle, pending the results of its theoretical development, why should we suppose
that it is nonetheless exempt from the particularly violent form of revision involved
in rejecting a previously accepted proposition on the grounds that it is self-contradic-
tory? If a proposition is hypothesised on the grounds that it might turn out to be false,
surely one should allow that it might turn out to be false in any way propositions can
be false, including being false by virtue of being self-contradictory.
be enough to indicate to anyone supposing there was such a relation as
Gentzler’s that ¬p doesn’t really sumfvne› (in the sense of “follow from”)
p! By such a method, Socrates could never find out if his hypothesis was
self-contradictory: his method would therefore be utterly useless.5
An example might help here. Take the hypothesis that heavier bodies
fall faster than lighter ones. That claim sounded safe and strong to no less
a thinker than Aristotle. Now imagine a cannon ball and a ping-pong ball
falling. It follows from the hypothesis that if we tie the two together, the
product will fall more slowly than the cannon ball alone, since the ping-
pong ball, by itself falling more slowly, will act as a drag on the cannon
ball. But since the conjunction of the cannon ball and the ping-pong ball
will be heavier than the cannon ball alone, even if only by a little, it also
follows that it will fall faster than the cannon ball alone. So a cannon ball
tied to a ping-pong ball will fall both faster and slower than a cannon ball
alone: we have a contradiction. Now the lesson Galileo famously drew at
this point was that the initial Aristotelian hypothesis is false, simply
because it entails this contradiction, and hence all bodies must fall at the
same velocity. But had he been working with Gentzler’s sumfvne›n rela-
tion, he could not have drawn this eminently sensible conclusion. For on
realising that the conclusion is inconsistent with the hypothesis – for con-
tradictions are inconsistent with every proposition – he would have
inferred that it does not sumfvne› the hypothesis. In that case, it is not
entailed by it, for entailment is sufficient for the sumfvne›n relation. Therefore
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6 Nicholas Denyer suggested this to me.
he would have racked his brains for where he went wrong in pursuing 
the ırmhy°nta of Aristotle’s hypothesis, and mechanics would be all the
poorer. Certainly he would not have been justified in inferring that the
Aristotelian hypothesis is false.
Of course it is one thing to complain that there is something method-
ologically wrong with the relation Gentzler reads into Socrates’ use of
sumfvne›n, quite another thing to say that this is not the relation he meant.
The considerations above about consistency and entailment are somewhat
refined, and may well not have occurred to Plato, for all that his probable
familiarity with mathematics would have put him in the way of countless
reductio proofs (not to mention the variety of such arguments in the dia-
logues). But for the moment I think that charity requires that we look for
an alternative account of the relation if one is available: and, even pre-
scinding from this problem, there is another motive for seeking a new
interpretation in any event. In order to work out what is going on here to
our satisfaction, our focus must not be restricted to the sumfvne›n rela-
tion, whatever it is, alone. Socrates is here giving us a criterion for decid-
ing on the truth and falsehood of propositions, and it is much too much
to hope that the relation he invokes will allow us to make truth-evalua-
tions of any proposition whatsoever relative to the hypothesis. So in order
to get to his meaning, then at the same time as we are considering the
sumfvne›n relation we shall have to find some interpretation of what
things – what class of propositions – we are supposed to classify as true
or false according to whether they bear the sumfvne›n/diafvne›n relations
to our original hypothesis. It is just this that is missing both from the obvi-
ously problematic interpretations of the sumfvne›n relation, but also from
Gentzler’s interim solution.
III. Consistency on a Subject Matter
One possibility for answering the second problem above is that the right
candidates for satisfying those relations will be propositions on the same
subject matter as the hypothesis.6 A proposition will sumfvne› the hypoth-
esis if it is consistent with it and on the same subject matter; it will
diafvne› the hypothesis if it is inconsistent with it and on the same sub-
ject matter; and if it is not on the same subject matter, it is not even a
candidate for satisfying either the sumfvne›n or diafvne›n relations with
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7 There would still be a problem, I think, with the results of a hypothesis entailing
one another. “Water is a compound” and “Water contains oxygen” are both proposi-
tions consistent with one another and on the subject “chemical composition of water”:
but they do not appear to entail one another, as I argued above. It might be that this
problem could be overcome by some suitable tweaking of the notion of a subject mat-
ter: one might argue that the two propositions are not really on the same subject mat-
ter, but that the former is about the chemical structure of water while the latter is
about the quite different subject of its constituents. But even if such a move could be
made successfully, it would be highly artificial and ad hoc; and I think the further
objections above are quite decisive against the subject matter interpretation.
8 A sign of this, of course, is the vast scholarly literature debating whether the the-
ory of causation at the end of the Phaedo countenances final, efficient and material
causes as well as formal ones. This debate could not have occurred if we could tell
on the face of it that Aristotle’s claim is inconsistent with Socrates’ hypothesis.
the hypothesis. Such a reading might have a rather attractive feature: pro-
vided you take into consideration the requirement about being on the same
subject matter, the sumfvne›n and diafvne›n relations amount unprob-
lematically to consistency and inconsistency. In effect, the constraint that
the candidate propositions be on the same subject matter as the hypothe-
sis synthesises the rival interpretations above which made Socrates’ theory
out to be ridiculous: for any proposition consistent with a hypothesis and
on the same subject matter should also be entailed by that hypothesis, pro-
vided we construe “subject matter” in a sufficiently fine-grained fashion.7
But this will not quite do as it stands, for the opacity of the relations
between different propositions on the same subject will make proceeding
with such a method practically impossible. For example, Socrates explic-
itly says that the subject matter of his hypothesis is “a causal account”
(100a6 per‹ afit¤aw): he is hypothesising about causation. But then what
attitude is he supposed to take, for instance, to another famous ancient
claim about causation, Aristotle’s claim that there are four causes? Is that
claim consistent or inconsistent with Socrates’ hypothesis? It certainly seems
to be a candidate for such a question, given that it is apparently about the
same subject matter, causation. But here we are in danger of reasoning as
follows: “Aristotle’s claim is on the same subject matter as Socrates’;
there is no detectable inconsistency between the two, at this stage;8 so on
these grounds we should suppose Aristotle’s claim true.” Obviously, this
would be a disastrous method of proceeding which would involve us in
asserting many falsehoods, simply because these means for deciding on
the truth-values of propositions are just too slender. But if instead we rea-
son that Aristotle’s claim is not yet a candidate for bearing the sum-
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9 Additionally, it would abnegate the need to specify what constraints an initial
fvne›n/diafvne›n relations to the hypothesis, then on the present inter-
pretation there is no explanation for this – why is it not yet a candidate,
given that it is at least about the same subject?
There is an even more serious problem with speaking of subject mat-
ters in this context. Intuitively, it seems that a subject matter is determined
by the fact that such-and-such propositions are all the right ones. If you
were to ask me “What is the subject matter of Chemistry? What is it all
about?” then I suppose I should best answer you by showing you an ele-
mentary Chemistry textbook – that is, by showing you a well-organised
collection of true propositions. On the other hand, this thought cannot be
quite correct: for when a boy makes a mistake in his Chemistry exam by
failing to balance his equation properly, it is not as if he has gone off the
subject altogether and started writing about a different topic such as his-
tory or botany. Our intuitions conflict here. Take the once-believed propo-
sition “There is a planet Vulcan between Mercury and the Sun”. Is that a
proposition about astronomy? Is it on the same subject matter as the truth
“There are nine planets in the solar system”? Well . . . yes and no. In a
way it is about astronomy because it tries to talk about the things astron-
omy deals with, planets and so forth. But in a way it is not about astron-
omy because it is false: there is no such planet as Vulcan, so what it
purports to speak of is not one of the objects of astronomy.
I infer from all this, even with the qualification that our intuitions some-
how conflict, that the notion of a subject matter is just a little too close
to the concept of truth for it to be entirely helpful in explicating Socrates’
method. The more we require candidates for the sumfvne›n relation to be
on the same subject matter as a hypothesis, the more we require them to
be true – that is, the more we deny ourselves the possibility of explain-
ing how they can be false. And we should not want to deny ourselves that
possibility. For one thing, as I have just said, Socrates’ method has got
to be one with which we can proceed. It is a constraint on any usable
heuristic procedure, which Socrates’ method is surely meant to be, that
we must be able to use it in advance of knowing the right answers, of
knowing what is true and what is false. Socrates must not be made out
to be saying “Start from a true hypothesis, and then set down as true any
propositions that are materially equivalent with it”: for that advice is no
more helpful to a philosopher than the recommendation “Bet on black
when the ball is going to land on black, and bet on red when it will land
on red” is to a roulette player.9 We must be able to move forward even
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hypothesis must satisfy: for one might just as well say “Proceed by putting down as
true all and only propositions that are materially equivalent with ‘2 + 2 = 4’”.
10 The theory that the soul is an attunement may have originated from the
Pythagorean philosopher and harmonic theorist Philolaus, to whom there is an allu-
sion at Phaedo 61d6-7. For further details see A. D. Barker, Greek Musical Writings
Volume II: Harmonic and Acoustic Theory (Cambridge 1989) pp. 38-9. Everything I
have to say about Greek music owes a great deal to this work, as well as its author’s
generous and invaluable correspondence.
11 If more justification is needed, I refer the reader to M. F. Burnyeat, “Plato on
Why Mathematics is Good for the Soul” in T. Smiley ed. Mathematics and Necessity
(London 2000) pp. 1-81. Burnyeat argues very plausibly that the key to understand-
ing the connection between the content of mathematics and the moral value that a
mathematical training is supposed to impart to the rulers of the ideal city, according
to the central books of the Republic, is to be found in the study of harmony (e.g. 
p. 47ff.). In other words, the real philosophical nature of the hypothetical method par
excellence, mathematics, is to be explicated best by an investigation of musical the-
ory. That is exactly what I am suggesting for the hypothetical method in the Phaedo.
from a false hypothesis, which means we must be able to suppose that
falsehoods sumfvne› the hypothesis without thereby failing to follow the
method. How can we do that on the present account if falsehoods do not,
in some important sense, have a subject matter?
IV. The Musical Connection
My own tack for responding to the problem of the sumfvne›n relation
involves examining the logically promising features of the musical sys-
tems suggested by the word, and seeing if appropriate analogues for them
can be found in good scientific theories. That we should look for inspira-
tion in music to help us here, and suppose that Plato might have done so
as well, is not at all perverse. The Phaedo is a dialogue thoroughly soaked
in musical allusions above and beyond the connotations of the word sum-
fvne›n. See, for instance, the reference to the lover’s lyre at 73d6, the
request for a “soothing song” at 77e8 (§pñdein, echoed at 114d7),
Simmias’ hypothesis that the soul is an attunement (èrmon¤a) at 85e5ff.,10
and so on. It should come as no surprise to find Socrates drawing detailed
philosophical inspiration from music and musical theory in a dialogue so
dominated by the figure of Apollo.11
Musical systems should interest us in this context because, at least at
first glance, they exhibit some of the properties we find in good theories.
That is, they are complex, well integrated systems whose elements (propo-
sitions in the one case, pitches in the other) agree with one another in
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12 See Symposium 187b4-5, where Erixymachus says that musical harmony is a kind
of agreement – sumfvn¤a d¢ ımolog¤a tiw.
13 It is also worth bearing in mind the fact that musical systems and collections of
lÒgoi are similar at a quite vertiginous level by virtue of the fact that they are both
somehow imitative. The imitative nature of lÒgoi is enough, in the Phaedo, to rec-
ommend them as the objects of investigation for the hypothetical method we are dis-
cussing. The imitative nature of the èrmon¤ai is enough to recommend the thought,
adumbrated in Republic 397a-401b, that they must be restricted and regimented in the
ideal city lest in aping undesirable emotions they do a disservice to the education of
the young.
14 More precisely: pitches related by intervals expressible in terms of ratios that are
either multiple (n:1) or epimoric (n+1:n). This seems to be the closest one can get to
a general characterisation of the sumfvn¤ai, although it expresses neither necessary
nor sufficient conditions for being a sumfvn¤a. Not all such ratios express sumfvn¤ai
(e.g. 3:1); and at least one interval forming a sumfvn¤a, the octave plus fourth, can-
not be expressed either as multiple or epimoric (its ratio is 8:3).
15 One of these intervals is actually mentioned by name when Socrates is illustrat-
ing the “subtle” things that will not receive opposites although they are not themselves
opposites. Among this class, we read at 105b1, is tÚ ≤miÒlion, the ratio of the fifth
(3:2). This is yet further evidence that Plato has music in mind in our passage.
some important sense,12 while also standing in significant and determinate
relations to one another. A musical èrmon¤a is not just a bunch of different
pitches, just as a correct theory is not just a mass of true propositions – in
both cases the ordering of, and relations between, the elements is important.13
The idea that musical systems are significantly structured is not some-
thing I have lifted anachronistically from contemporary diatonic music. It
lay at the heart of Greek music as well. Its origins appear to lie in the
thought that pitches related by certain intervals14 – the octave, the perfect
fifth and the perfect fourth – blend together to form a unified whole, 
a sumfvn¤a, while notes that are otherwise related do not form such 
integrations.15 The various familiar species of Greek èrmon¤ai, Dorian,
Mixolydian and so forth, are then constructed by permuting other pitches
in various ways on to a basic structure of sumfvn¤ai. èrmon¤ai are there-
fore ordered structures of pitches constituted by relations of different
strengths: weak relations which must hold between all the notes in a
èrmon¤a in order for it to count as a complete musical structure, and
stronger relations which hold between certain pitches in the èrmon¤a
which are sufficient for those pitches to form sumfvn¤ai. It is the latter
that especially concern us in explicating my view of the Phaedo’s concept
of sumfvne›n.
Plato gives us a characterization of these special intervals in the
Timaeus, when he has Timaeus argue that different pitches succeed in
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16 Both these passages are discussed in A. D. Barker, Op. Cit. pp. 76 & 62 respectively.
17 This is convenient: for if they did then we would need an argument about the
extent of Plato’s detailed knowledge of harmonic theory, which would be extremely
difficult to formulate. M. F. Burnyeat, Op. Cit. p. 15ff., argues that he was at least
familiar enough with the writings of the Pythagorean harmonic theorist Archytas of
Tarentum to quote him (consciously or unconsciously) at Republic 530d8.
18 I have in mind: P. Kitcher, “Two Approaches to Explanation” in Journal of
Philosophy LXXXII 1985 pp. 632-639; W. Salmon, “Scientific Explanation: Causation
and Unification” in Causality and Explanation (Oxford 1998) pp. 68-78. The exam-
ple I use is taken from Salmon. A more general statement of the view that explana-
tions can both explain something and be themselves explained by it is to be found in
W. V. O. Quine and J. Ullian, The Web of Belief (New York 1970) p. 79: “. . . there
can be mutual reinforcement between an explanation and what it explains. Not only
does a supposed truth gain credibility if we can think of something that would explain
forming sumfvn¤ai when “by attaching a similarity, they blend together
a single experience out of high-pitched and low-pitched movement”
(ımoiÒthta prosãcantew, m¤an §j Ùje¤aw ka‹ bare¤aw sunekerãsanto pãyhn
80b4-5). Aristotle was also interested in the sumfvn¤ai, giving them a
very similar description at De Sensu 448a9-11. Pitches standing in appro-
priate ratios to one another form a mixture whereby each note is perceived
simultaneously when the sumfvn¤a as a whole is heard as one thing: oÈd¢
tå memeigm°na ëma (lÒgoi gãr efisin éntikeim°nvn, oÂon tÚ diå pas«n ka‹
tÚ diå p°nte), §ån mØ …w ©n afisyãnhtai.16
Now the precise musical details need not concern us here.17 All we need
is the thought that, within a musical structure, a èrmon¤a, certain pitches
are so related to one another that they form some kind of unity, which
notes that are not so related do not form. When notes are in the ratios
2:1, 3:2 or 4:3, they blend together to form sumfvn¤ai. Notes within the
èrmon¤a that are not so related do not form this strong unity together,
although they are still part of the same structure. Is there a relation hold-
ing between the lÒgoi of a good theory about causation that is analogous
to this special unifying relation holding between the pitches in a sum-
fvn¤a? That is, can we find two propositions so related that they form,
as it were, some kind of unity over and above their being merely asserted
together, just as two pitches in the ratio 2:1 or 3:2 blend to form a sum-
fvn¤a (an octave or a fifth) over and above their being each sounded?
I think there is enough information in the Phaedo to suggest that
Socrates’ hypothesis and its results might stand in such a relation to one
another – a relation sometimes discussed in recent philosophy of science.18
This relation holds between propositions if they stand as explanations of
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it, but also conversely: an explanation gains credibility if it accounts for something
we suppose to be true.”
19 Kitcher and Salmon call this style of explanation “bottom-up”, referring to the
direction we move in going from the explanandum to the explanans. But many philoso-
phers use “top-down” as an expression for explanation of the particular by the more
general. Hence I avoid the terminology altogether.
20 I have occasionally encountered resistance to the thought that “Pennies conduct”
is any kind of explanation of “Copper is a conductor”. Perhaps the example is too
trivial to express the point. Certainly I grant that it is not a generalising explanation
of the latter; and I grant too that in science we are often more interested in general-
ising explanations than other kinds since it is the particulars with which we are already
familiar through perception. But these concessions are neither individually nor jointly
sufficient for scepticism about the possibility of particularising explanations. It is mere
question begging to suppose either that generalising explanations are the only expla-
nations, or that whenever we want an explanation we already have a grasp on some
quite particular fact and are casting about for a more general one.
one another, albeit in different ways. Take the two propositions “Copper
is a conductor” and “Pennies conduct electricity”. These claims form a
kind of unity because they provide one another with mutual explanatory
support. The claim that copper is a conductor stands as an explanation for
the claim that pennies conduct by being more general than the latter: it
says what it is about pennies that makes them conduct, and that what pen-
nies are made of conducts whether it is in penny form or not. One might
similarly explain in turn the claim that copper is a conductor with the
claim that metals are conductors. Again, we say what it is about copper
that makes it a conductor. And one might again explain this proposition
with the claim that electrons in such-and-such a relation conduct elec-
tricity, and so on. I shall call this generalising explanation:19 we explain
particular facts by subsuming them under more and more general laws –
“higher” principles, as Plato would call them. But there is also what I
shall call particularising explanation, which seeks to explain away the
most general explanatory formulae by characterizing such truths as laws
about causal relations between particular things. The idea is that the laws
are shown to be true by virtue of the explanatory support they get from
their instantiations. In this way, we can give a kind of explanation for the
claim that copper is a conductor by pointing out that there are particular
copper things, namely pennies, and that they all conduct electricity.20
I think that both these kinds of explanation are on display in the
Phaedo. Socrates’ starting point is the general one about the causal power
of Forms, which we might represent schematically as “There is such a
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thing as the f, and if anything else happens to be f, then it is f by the
f”. From this we get a handful of ırmhy°nta:
1. When something is f, then f-ness is somehow in that thing.
2. Anything that is f by the f is different from that by which it is f.
(It is by Simmias’ largeness that he overtops Socrates, not by his
nature.)
3. If f and c are opposites, then the f or c in things will not toler-
ate the advance of the other: either it will retreat or perish on the
approach of its opposite.
It seems to me that in moving from the original hypothesis to 1, 2 and 3,
we get successive particularising explanations: 1, 2 and 3 explain how
Socrates’ hypothesis can be true by exploring what happens in particular
applications of that very general claim. 1 for instance explicates the details
of what is meant by “f by the f”: when something is “f by the f”, that
is because something of the f is in that thing. Likewise, 2 gives some par-
ticularising explanation for 1: it says a little about how the agents of cau-
sation are in their subjects. Since they are different from their subjects,
they are in them without being them. And in turn 3 provides further expla-
nation for 2 by suggesting that the domain over which the variable 
f ranges, containing the properties that are in things without being them,
is populated by things that have opposites. The things that can have f in
them – Simmias’ size, Socrates’ fingers, Phaedo’s face – are not the sort
of things that have opposites: this is why such things must be different
from the causal agents in them, as 2 asserts. 2 gives particularising expla-
nation for 1 while 3 explains 2 in a similar fashion.
But equally, we have generalising explanations here. Suppose someone
were to ask “How is it that certain properties of a thing are capable of
doing such things as advancing, retreating or perishing? That is, how is it
that 3 is true?” We can explain this with the more general 2: certain prop-
erties are capable of doing such things because they are different from the
things that have them, and hence can advance into or retreat from the
hosts from which they are different without impairing their identity. We
can explain this in turn by ascending to 1. Things have properties that are
different from themselves while still characterising them when they have
them because, when they have them, those properties are somehow in
them. And if we ask for a more general explanation of this fact, we get
it from Socrates’ original hypothesis: properties are in things because,
more generally, when something other than the f itself is f, it is so in
Phronesis 50,2_159_95-115  4/28/05  10:14 PM  Page 108
LOGIC AND MUSIC IN PLATO’S PHAEDO 109
21 This is not an end to their logical similarity. In addition to being asymmetrical,
concordant relations are irreflexive – no pitch blends into a sumfvn¤a with itself –
and non-transitive, in that in some cases where pitch a blends with b and b with c, a
will also blend with c (as when b is a perfect fifth above a and c a perfect fourth
above b, where c will be an octave above a), but in other cases a will blend with b
and b with c without a also blending with c (I give an example of this later on in the
main text). These logical properties also hold of explanation. The kind of explanations
in which I am interested are irreflexive: the proposition p is surely neither a general-
ising nor a particularising explanation of itself (although I grant that some proposi-
tions can, in some sense, be self-explanatory). Such explanations are also non-
transitive, in that sometimes where p explains q and q explains r, p will explain r, but
sometimes not.
virtue of, because of, something else, the f. In fact Socrates is quite
explicit that he intends to reach his conclusion using this kind of gener-
alising explanation, when he says at 100b7-9 that ì e‡ moi d¤dvw te ka‹
sugxvre›w e‰nai taËta, §lp¤zv soi §k toÊtvn tØn afit¤an §pide¤jein ka‹
éneurÆsein …w éyãnaton ≤ cuxÆ. The hope is that he can explain the par-
ticular fact that the soul is immortal by showing how it is related to truths
about coming to be and passing away generally.
I have been arguing that the same sort of relationship holds between
Socrates’ hypothesis and its various ırmhy°nta, taken as pairs of propo-
sitions, as holds between the propositions “Copper is a conductor” and
“Pennies conduct electricity”. As pairs of propositions, they form a unity
in virtue of supporting one another in different ways, by providing differ-
ent kinds of explanation, generalising or particularising, for one another.
Both kinds of explanation hold, in different directions, between the
hypothesis and 1, 1 and 2, and 2 and 3. And this is strongly analogous to
the way in which pairs of pitches form a unity by blending with one
another. Two notes an octave apart do not bear the same relation to one
another. For while blending is a symmetrical relation, the precise relation
of lying in such and such a ratio to another pitch is asymmetrical.21
Likewise, the propositions about copper and pennies above do not bear
the same relation to one another. For while explanation, as I have argued,
is a symmetrical relation, the precise relations of generalisingly explaining
or particularisingly explaining are asymmetrical. And in both cases, the
musical and the theoretical, something new emerges from the combination
of the two things so related – a blended unity – which does not emerge,
for instance, when we sound a pitch together with another six semi-tones
above it, or when we conjoin truths such as “Cats are mammals” and
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“Sydney is in Australia”. The two pitches do not form a sumfvn¤a and
blend into a musical unity, just as the two propositions do not blend into
an explanatory unity.
V. The Solution proves its worth
At this point one might object that the musical analogy amounts to a mere
interesting observation rather than a plausible theory about how Plato
might have understood the special kind of agreement that occurs between
propositions when they sumfvne› one another. It might be that Plato has
Socrates develop his hypothesis in the way in which he does without ever
thinking of musical sumfvn¤ai at all, and any workable analogy with con-
cordant relations in musical theory is pure coincidence. And I admit that
this is perfectly possible. But let me restate the case for the analogy now
that I have explicated its non-musical aspect. It seems to me that we need
an answer to the following question. Given the likelihood that Plato was
asking himself “What more is required of a proposition besides consis-
tency with the hypothesis if it is to count among that hypothesis’ ırmhy°nta?”,
to what kind of structure would he turn his mind for an answer? It seems
likely that he would first think of a mathematical structure, given that
mathematics is the most obvious example of a science that reasons from
hypotheses, as Socrates takes himself to be doing in our passage. But if
he was thinking of mathematics, he would almost certainly have thought
of harmonic theory, especially since music has already been such an
important theme in the Phaedo. And if he was thinking of harmonic the-
ory, he might well have been struck by the way certain privileged inter-
vals form stronger and more interesting relations between their pitches
than other equally musical intervals within the èrmon¤a, just as some
propositions form stronger and more interesting relations with propositions
they explain, and are explained by, than other propositions equally con-
sistent with them.
Let us turn once again to the problems facing the method outlined
above to see if the new interpretation overcomes them. We saw that there
was a problem about cashing out sumfvne›n solely in terms of consis-
tency and “being on the same subject matter” as a hypothesis. We won-
dered how one could arbitrate between propositions on the same subject
matter as a falsehood, because it isn’t clear how a false proposition can
have a subject matter. Things are much clearer when we deal instead with
the notion of explanation. For it is perfectly possible for a proposition to
be consistent with another and explanatory of it, and vice versa, even
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when both are false. My explanation takes into account the possibility of
someone asserting a false hypothesis and then mistakenly putting down as
true falsehoods that genuinely sumfvne› it without thereby failing to fol-
low the method. In other words I can clearly explain how we can proceed
with Socrates’ method without already having the right answers, which
the “subject matter” interpretation could not – which means I can con-
tinue to hold for the moment that the hypothetical method is genuinely
heuristic.
Again, it was not clear what we should do with a proposition on the
same subject matter as a hypothesis, but neither clearly consistent nor
inconsistent with it. Aristotle’s claim that there are four causes bore this
relation to Socrates’ hypothesis. But if Socrates is looking for propositions
that are consistent with his hypothesis but also explain it and are explained
by it, then it seems we are on safer ground. For while we may not be able
to tell initially whether a proposition on the same subject matter as our
hypothesis is consistent or inconsistent with it, we can tell with much
greater ease whether the proposition bears an explanatory relation to the
hypothesis or one of its results. Explanation is much more transparent 
to our minds than consistency, as the career of Frege testifies. Since 
Aristotle’s claim that there are four causes does not seem to cohere in the
right way with either the hypothesis or the results mentioned so far, that
is a sufficient reason not to put the claim down as true. But since there is
not any detectable inconsistency either, we ought not to put it down as
false. So it must be one of the infinite number of propositions which is
not a candidate for either of the sumfvne›n/diafvne›n relations. Here
again this interpretation scores well against the “subject matter” one described
above. There is no danger of supposing Aristotle’s thesis true simply because
it is on the same subject matter as the hypothesis and not detectably incon-
sistent with it: for it does not adequately explain it. We also have a gen-
eral answer to the question “what more is required from a proposition
about a certain subject matter for us to be able to proceed with it (i.e.
make a decision about its truth-value) rather than temporarily lay it aside
and cast about for others?” The account says this: we can proceed if and
only if it is either detectably inconsistent with the hypothesis, or both con-
sistent with it and a good explanation of it in the sense elucidated. If a
proposition satisfies neither of these conditions, that is sufficient reason for
supposing that it cannot yet satisfy the sumfvne›n/diafvne›n relations, and
hence is not yet a candidate for truth-evaluation.
From this we can also derive the interesting result that the diafvne›n
relation is the contrary, not the contradictory, of the sumfvne›n relation.
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For I am saying that a proposition will sumfvne›n another if it satisfies a
conjunction of conditions: it must be consistent with it and explain it.
Since the negation of a conjunction is the disjunction of the negated con-
juncts, then any proposition will satisfy that relation relative to another if
it is either inconsistent with it or fails to explain it in the right way. So
if the diafvne›n relation were the contradictory of sumfvne›n, then we
would once again be lost in a ruinous wilderness, putting down as false
all those propositions which fail to explain our hypothesis, which will once
again include propositions we have independent reasons to suppose true
and, worse, contradictory pairs. Therefore the diafvne›n relation had bet-
ter be its contrary, consisting simply in inconsistency with the hypothesis
or one of its results. Put another way, the diafvne›n relation is not the
negation of the sumfvne›n relation, but its opposite. This should come as
no surprise at all given that Socrates’ Second Voyage embodies the most
opposition-fixated passage of an opposition-fixated dialogue.
The musical analogy also helps us to give a little colour to the “yet”s
at the end of the last paragraph but one. As I have said, we have to sup-
pose at least initially that Aristotle’s claim that there are four causes is
not yet a candidate for the sumfvne›n/diafvne›n relations. But if we are
to have a fully developed theory of causation it surely must become one
at some point. After all, a completely satisfactory theory of causation must
be one that says, among other things, how many sorts of causation there
are. In fact we have to suppose generally that in the development of a
theory a large number of propositions start out beyond the pale of con-
sideration but become candidates later on. Fortunately, exactly the same
thing can happen in music. To illustrate this, let us simplify things by
putting the point in modern terms. Take, for instance, a note of pitch C,
which is going to be the starting pitch and basis for a scale or attunement
just as an initial hypothesis is the starting point and basis for a theory
about something. The C an octave higher will form a sumfvn¤a with it.
So will the F a fourth above middle C and the G a fifth above it. What
about the D that lies a tone above the starting point? It does not form a
sumfvn¤a with the initial C, when just those two notes are considered:
tones are not sumfvn¤ai. But it does form a sumfvn¤a with the G a fifth
above C, since it lies a perfect fourth below it. Hence, as the complex of
relations is developed further and further, new notes form sumfvn¤ai
within the system that were incapable of forming such unities earlier when
the right pitches with which to blend were not yet available. C does not
blend with D by itself. But since C blends with G, and G blends with D,
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22 I do not of course mean that you will get a sumfvn¤a if you sound C, G and D
together. The tone interval between C and D will disrupt the purity of the fifth between
C and G. But if one goes from C to G, and thence to D, one always proceeds accord-
ing to intervals of the right kind. This recalls the sense suggested at the end of Republic
VI in which the hypothetical method involves somehow moving from one proposition
to another in a sequence, a thing only dialectic does from a proper first principle.
23 I owe this observation to Ben Morison.
the structure CGD forms a unity held together by the middle term, G.22
And one can imagine the same sort of thing happening to Aristotle’s
claim. It does not blend with Socrates’ hypothesis or any of the results
adumbrated in our section of the Phaedo because it does not explain any
of them in the right way. But it may well be that it will blend with propo-
sitions added later on in the development of the theory, which themselves
blend explanatorily with earlier results, in which case it ought to be
counted as true.
This musical understanding of sumfvne›n also helps us, I think, to
understand better why Socrates is so keen to stress the value of order
when he concludes the introduction of the method that relies upon this
relation. Consideration of the explanatory relations I have been using to
characterize the meaning of sumfvne›n sharpens the issue. For it seems
to be perfectly possible that two propositions could be consistent with your
hypothesis and explanatory of it, without bearing that relation to one
another.23 For instance, starting from the hypothesis “Metals conduct elec-
tricity”, we might put down as true “Copper conducts electricity” on the
grounds that it is consistent with the hypothesis and affords it some par-
ticularising explanation. But for the very same reasons, we might put
down as true the claim “Mercury conducts electricity”. So should we put
both of them down as true, on the basis of the indifference argument that,
since there is not yet more reason to assert one rather than the other, and
one needs to assert something in order to get anywhere, therefore one must
assert both? No: there are reasons for thinking we ought not to assert both,
on the present interpretation. For even though the claim about copper and
the claim about mercury are perfectly consistent with one another, it is far
from clear that they afford each other explanatory support of the sort I
have been discussing, since neither is more general nor more particular
than the other. They are, as it were, propositions “of the same level”.
There could only be collateral support between them. But it is doubtful
that there is any such thing. It just does not seem to matter to the fact
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that copper is a conductor, by itself, whether or not mercury is one as
well. But if we take ourselves to be following Plato’s hypothetical method
in this set-up, it ought to matter. For Socrates says that you have finished
developing your hypothesis only when you know that its results bear the
right relation, not just to it, but to one another. All the ırmhy°nta must
éllÆloiw sumfvne› in order for the reasoner to proceed to giving a lÒgow
for the hypothesis itself.
This is a nettle I am prepared to grasp: it seems to me in the nature of
the sumfvne›n relation that, at any stage, many candidates for satisfying
it – p, q, r and so on – will emerge, only one of which can be selected
at a time and put down as true, say p, on the grounds that the others, q
and r, do not cohere with p in the right way, even though they are con-
sistent with it and cohere no less in the right way with the hypothesis. For
anyone following Plato’s method from the hypothesis that metals conduct
electricity, he will have to decide which of the two particularising expla-
nations to go for, assert that, and stay silent at least for the moment about
the others, however strange that looks. Presumably, the idea would be to
develop the hypothesis via one proposition, and then start again by putting
down as true the other, and then comparing the degree to which the result-
ing sets of propositions form adequate theories of the kind the hypothet-
ical method is after. It should not be a surprise by now that the same thing
can happen in music. From the starting point C, one will get a sumfvn¤a
with the F a fourth above it, or alternatively the G a fifth above – both
notes are suitably related to the original. But one cannot, as it were, go
for both of these pitches together. For the F and the G do not blend into
a sumfvn¤a. They are not related to one another as each is to C. One
must choose one of them at a time if one intends to develop a musical
complex of the right sort from C, and there may at first be no more rea-
son to choose one rather than the other. This strain of indeterminacy
brings out the element of unexplained talent that will be required for a
successful application of the method. Socrates has no story to tell about
why you should put down as true one particular proposition from the many
candidates that will emerge. But he does at least realise that the plurality
of candidates is going to mean that one must pay special attention to the
order in which one is proceeding – order forced upon the reasoner by the
nature of the sumfvne›n relation – perhaps so that the hypothesiser can
effectively retrace his steps and start developing his hypothesis all over
again with different propositions that sumfvne› it without also bearing that
relation to the first asserted batch of ırmhy°nta.
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24 I am very grateful to Nicholas Denyer and David Sedley, both of whom read this
piece several times and saved me from many mistakes, as well as providing much
helpful input and encouragement. But I am especially grateful to Andrew Barker, with-
out whom it could not have been written at all.
I hope that this has gone some way to establishing my view that, for
Plato, theory building is a kind of propositional orchestration. There is
much of which I am uncertain, and much that this paper lacks the space
to consider in detail, but I am convinced of the appropriateness of that
general description. Of course the analogy goes lame in this respect: there
are presumably better and worse ways of developing a hypothesis via the
right coherence relations as described above, but it is presumably not the
case that there are better and worse ways of following a starting pitch
with the right concordant intervals. But nonetheless in developing the
analogy we have found that the hypothetical method is much richer and
more sophisticated than Socrates’ brief sketch conveys, which is some-
thing we should prefer – especially given the reasons I have set out indi-
cating that Plato has music in mind anyhow in this context.24
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